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A Feminist Social Justice
Approach to Reproduction-Assisting
Technologies:

A Case Study on the

Limits of Liberal Theory*
BY JOAN C. CALLAHAN**
AND DOROTHY E. ROBERTS***

INTRODUCTION

n recent years, child welfare agencies in the United States have
seized thousands of infants who have been exposed prenatally to
various illicit drugs.' A number of these seizures have resulted in the

* Portions of this Article have been adapted with permission from Joan C.
Callahan, The ContractMotherhoodDebate, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICs 82 (1993);
Joan C. Callahan & Patricia Smith, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and
Feminism, in LIBERALISM AND COMMUNITY (Noel Reynolds et al. eds.,
forthcoming); Joan C. Callahan, Professions, Institutions, and Moral Risk, in
DANIEL E. WUESTE, PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 243
(1994); Feminism and Reproductive Technologies, 5 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 75
(1994); Editor's Introduction: Reproduction, Ethics, and the Law: Feminist

Perspectives,inREPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
1 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104
HARv. L. REV. 1419 (1991); Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, Procreative
Liberty, and the Limits of Liberal Theory: Robertson's Children of Choice, 20
L.& Soc. INQUIRY 1005 (1995). Special thanks to Pat Smith for permission to
adapt material here from her paper with Joan Callahan.
** Professor of Philosophy, University of Kentucky. Ph.D. 1982, University
of Maryland.
*** Professor of Law, Rutgers University. B.A. 1977, Yale College; J.D.
1980, Harvard Law School.
'See, e.g., Janet Gallagher, CollectiveBadFaithandProtectingthe Fetus,
in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 343 (Joan
C. Callahan ed., 1995); Dorothy E. Roberts, PunishingDrugAddicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color,Equality, andthe Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
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prosecution of women for drug use during pregnancy as a form of child
abuse.' Despite the fact that drug use during pregnancy seems to be
equally prevalent among women of all races in the United States, studies
are beginning to show that black women are nearly ten times more likely
than other women to be reported to child welfare agencies for drug use
during pregnancy, and that at least seventy percent of the prosecutions are
of women of color.3 Additionally, over eighty percent of court-ordered
cesarean sections have been for women of color and non-native United
States women. These women are virtually always dependent on public
health care facilities.4 What's wrong with this picture?
In December 1990, Norplant, the contraceptive implant, was approved
in the United States.5 Almost immediately, courts attempted to impose
the implantation of Norplant as a condition of probation on women
convicted of child abuse.6 In seventy-five percent of these cases, the
probationers have been minority women, and all of them have been
welfare recipients.7 What's wrong with this picture?
Liberals argue that women contracting into so-called surrogate mother
arrangements should be held to their contracts!8 Since these contracts are
usually sought by men who want their own sperm used to progenerate,
this would ensure that these men obtain children who are genetically
1419 (1991).
2 Roberts, supra note 1, at 1421.
3 Id. at 1434.
4 Gallagher, supra note 1, at 354.
' Melissa Burke, Note, The Constitutionalityof the Use of the Norplant
ContraceptiveDevice as a Condition ofProbation, 20 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q.
207, 207 (1992).
6id.

7 See Joan C. Callahan, ContraceptionorIncarceration:What's Wrongwith
this Picture?,7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 67 (1996); Burke, supra note 5, at 241.
8 See,

e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE

NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994). We take it that the term "surrogate

mother" is no longer acceptable. Minimally, the term begs the question of who
is the real mother of a child born as the result of a contract arrangement. Birth
mothers are certainly biological mothers of the children they bear and birth, even
when they are not genetic mothers. Contract motherhood arrangements between
women and men usually involve progeneration from the man's sperm and the
gestational mother's egg, making her as fully the child's genetic parent as the
genetic father. To call such a woman a "surrogate" mother (as was done in the
case of Baby M) is to elevate a man's genetic connection to a child over a
woman's gestational and genetic connection to that child. The term "surrogate"
is just one example of how deeply embedded male privilege is in our society.
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related to them. Even without state enforcement of these contracts, in
every case that has gone to court in the United States, men have
succeeded in gaining custody of resulting children who are genetically
related to them, whether or not the gestational mothers seeking custody
were also the genetic mothers of the children at issue.9 What's wrong
with this picture?
Specialized fertility services (such as ovulation drugs,"0 in vitro
fertilization ("IVF") and embryo transfer," gamete intrafallopian
transfer ("GIFT"), 2 zygote intrafallopian transfer ("ZIFT"), 3 artificial
insemination, 4 surgery, or other treatment for blocked fallopian
tubes 5) are twice as likely to be obtained by non-Hispanic white women
than by Hispanic or non-Hispanic black women seeking treatment for
impaired fecundity, and three times more likely to be obtained by such
women who have household incomes at least 149% above the poverty
level than by those with lower household incomes. 6 What's wrong with
this picture?
What is wrong with all of these pictures is that they suggest that there
are systematic inequities along the axes of sex, race, and class in several
areas of contemporary human reproduction. We find these inequities
troubling. Our purpose in this paper is threefold: (1) to suggest how
' See, e.g., Christine Overall, The CaseAgainstthe LegalizationofContract
Motherhood, in CHmSTINE OVERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES,
PRACTICES, POLICiEs 119 (1993); Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Perspectivesand
GestationalMotherhood: The Searchfor a UnifiedLegal Focus, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPEcTIvEs 55 (Joan C. Callahan ed.,
1995); and several of the papers in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND
PRIvAcy (Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
o Drugs that cause the maturation of several of a woman's eggs at one time.
""In vitro fertilization" is fertilization of one or more of a woman's eggs
outside of her body, e.g., in a petri dish. "Embryo transfer" is the removal of an
embryo from one woman's uterus and placement of it in another woman's uterus.
12 "Gamete intrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of gametes (i.e., eggs
and/or sperm) into a woman's fallopian tube.
13 "Zygote intrafallopian transfer" is the transfer of a newly fertilized egg
or zygote into a woman's fallopian tube.
14 "Artificial insemination" is the insemination of a woman with technological assistance, e.g., with a syringe.
"sThe fallopian tubes allow the transport of a woman's eggs from her
ovaries to her uterus. Fertilization or conception usually occurs in the fallopian
tubes.
16 Lynne S. Wilcox & William D. Mosher, Use of Infertility Services in the
UnitedStates, OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, July 1993, at 122, 124.
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contemporary liberal theory leads to these inequities, (2) to contribute to
a systematic articulation and illumination of a feminist social justice
approach to questions of law and policy that addresses concerns about
these systematic inequities, and (3) to show why this approach should be
standard in any society that purports to take the interests of all its citizens
equally seriously, no matter what their social location. In particular, we
mean to show that a feminist social justice approach better serves the
fundamental moral ideals embraced by liberalism, namely individual
liberty and the moral equality of persons, than does contemporary liberal
theory. We do this by focusing on contemporary reproduction-assisting
technologies as a case study to help see where contemporary liberalism
leaves us in regard to these technologies and why that position is
deficient on each of the liberal's own axiological axes of liberty and
equality.

I. THE FEMiNST SOCIAL JUSTICE REJECTION OF LIBERALISM
A.

LiberalIndividualism as Ideology

Liberal individualism is a set of general ideas that purports to explain
the world and leads to the structuring of society and its political
institutions according to a set of normative convictions that cohere with
the explanatory beliefs internal to the system. That is, liberal individualism functions as an ideology with certain fundamental ontological
commitments and consequent moral commitments. Liberal individualism
operates according to methods that follow from these ontological and
moral commitments. An examination of any ideology, such as liberal
individualism, will concern itself with (1) how a particular system of
beliefs conceptualizes human nature, (2) how that conceptualization of
human nature is linked to normative beliefs regarding morally appropriate
distributions of power and goods in society, and (3) what ontological
commitments and moral values are embedded in the methods the system
uses to interpret, construct, evaluate, and revise social and political
institutions and practices, and to interpret, evaluate, and influence
individual behaviors. In short, an ideology shapes the way a group looks
at the world. It functions as a kind of perceptual screen or filter that
interprets reality factually, evaluates it normatively, and leads to certain
positions on what are considered social problems and how those problems
should be resolved. As an ideology, liberal individualism presumes an
ontology of persons which tends to lead to a particular set of substantive,
normative, and methodological commitments. As we shall see, a feminist

1995-96]

1201

A FEMINIST SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH

social justice approach rejects these components of contemporary
liberalism.
B.

The Liberal Ontology of Persons and the Liberal Morality
of Rights

Historically, liberalism arose in Europe between the Reformation and
the French Revolution as a reaction to the power of kings, aristocrats, and
the church. One of the first systematizers of liberal theory was John
Locke, who inspired Thomas Jefferson, and whose Second Treatise of
Civil Government'7 directly underpins the United States Bill of Rights.
Locke conceived the human person as, fundamentally, an atomistic entity
- a full-fledged human being existing prior to society, making up (to mix
the metaphors) a kind of ontological moral space that cannot be
transgressed without permission. Political authority, in Locke's view, can
only be justified on the ground of consent of the governed. All "men"
come into the world on an equal moral footing, with equal entitlements
to goods and powers and equal entitlements to freedom. Now, Locke, of
course, was systematizing a political theory for Whigs. When he said "all
men" he did not actually mean that. What he meant was dictated by his
own experience of who counted-propertied men, including landholders,
merchants and industrialists, who should not be subject to an absolute
monarch. This, of course, did not include women generally, or men or
women of the underclass in particular.'" So, from the very beginning of
its systematization, liberalism was structured from a perspective that
included some persons but not others. Indeed, Locke himself provides the
first fully systematic argument for capitalism and the right to amass
virtually unlimited amounts of property, a strange irony in a theory which
starts out so unequivocally committed to the moral equality of all persons
and the initial right of each person to have "as much and as good" as any
other.
The atomistic ontology of persons underpinning Locke's theory
continues to anchor liberalism in its several contemporary varieties,
including liberal feminism, which we shall discuss shortly. Filled out, the
fundamental social notion at work in liberal ontology is that persons are
radically individualized agents, that the uniqueness of human beings is
'7 JOHN

LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIvIL GOVERNMENT

DeKoster ed., 1978) (1689).

18 See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE DISORDER OF WOMEN

PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACr

(1988).

(1989);

(Lester
CAROLE
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characterized by the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that the
protection of individual autonomy is the keystone of a morally wellordered society. The ontological understanding of human beings as
radically discrete and autonomous tends to issue in a morality that rests
fundamentally on rights that define the moral boundaries of these
essentially unconnected individuals. Thus, Lockean liberalism finds itself
committed to a morality that is preoccupied with respecting and
negotiating these independent moral spaces. Such a world view starts out
conceptualizing persons as adversarially related, and sets the stage for a
political society that needs to be based on managing adversity. This
human ontology and its consequent contemporary construction of
fundamental morality as a morality of overriding rights to noninterference
is central to feminist social justice rejections of liberalism.
C. Feminism and Liberal Feminism
Although all views appropriately characterized as feminist views are
concerned with the position and flourishing of all women, it is crucially
important to realize that feminism is not monolithic. Indeed, feminists
disagree about a great many issues. Feminist perspectives can be found
in moral and political theories as diverse as rights-based liberalism,
Utilitarianism, and Marxism, and in ontologies that range from essentialist
accounts that ascribe a unique nature to women, through pure social
construction accounts of women's nature, 9 to positional feminisms that
attempt to avoid the problems with essentialist and antiessentialist
feminisms by leaving open the question of women's essential nature and
concentrating instead on how the social position of women raises
problems for women as such.2"
At the same time, however, we understand all views that are
coherently understood as feminist views to share certain features, namely:

1"For extended discussions of variations in feminist thought, see, for
example, JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY: THE INTELLECTUAL
TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1985); ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST
POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE (1983); ROSEMARIE TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT:

A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION (1989).

For an account of the problems with both essentialist and antiessentialist,
or nominalist, feminisms, see Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus PostStructuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988)
(attempting to avoid these problems in a theory that rejects a commitment to
essentialism but allows that, in fact, women as a class have a gendered identity
that leads to certain characteristically "women's needs" in the present world).
20
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(1) a recognition that women as a group have been and remain in a
subordinate position in relation to men;
(2) an account of the source(s) of that subordination; and
(3)21 suggestions for how the subordination of women can be overcome.

Recent feminist approaches, particularly in the work of women of
color, frequently include:
(4) an account of the ways in which women have resisted oppression.22
It is also the case that contemporary feminist approaches are almost

invariably:
(5) acutely aware that social subordination is not limited to women,
and
(6) deeply committed to the elimination of centrisms that systematically place members of one group in a position of lesser value than
persons of other groups (centrisms such as sexism, racism, heterosexism,
regionalism, classism, ageism, and ableism).
It is also common for contemporary feminists to:
(7) understand these systems of subordination and oppression as
interlocking in the sense that one cannot hope for the elimination of one
without accomplishing the elimination of others.
These, then, are the features we take to be essentially (1-3) and
commonly (4-7) associated with a feminist consciousness or perspective
in any domain.
"Liberal feminists" were the first to recognize women as a sexual
class, that is, to recognize women as in a collective position in relation
to men. As Zillah Eisenstein points out: "Liberal feminism is not
feminism merely added to liberalism. Rather, there is a real difference
between liberalism and liberal feminism in that feminism requires a
recognition, however implicit and undefined, of the sexual-class
identification of women as women. 2 3 Liberal feminism is so called

Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Ethics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICs 361
(Laurence C. Becker & Charlotte B. Becker eds., 1992); cf.ROSEMARIE TONG,
FEMININE AND FEMINIST ETHICS 10-11 (1993) (explaining Alison Jaggar's view
21

that a feminist approach to ethics seeks to: "1. articulate moral critiques of
actions and practicesthat perpetuatewomen's subordination; 2. prescribemorally
justifiable ways of resisting such actions and practices; and 3. envision morally
desirable alternatives that will promote women's emancipation").
22 See, e.g., PATRICIA H. COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF POWER (1991).
2 ZILLAH R. EISENSTEN, THE RADICAL FUTURE OF LmEPAL FEMINISM 6
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because it at once shares the essential commitments that bind characteristically feminist views (i.e., minimally, features 1-3 above), while also
sharing the fundamental ontological and normative commitments of
liberalism - commitments that "postliberal feminists" have rejected. For
example, like liberals simpliciter,liberal feminists assume that persons are
radically individualized autonomous agents, that the uniqueness of human
beings is located in the capacity for rationality and autonomy, and that
the protection of individual autonomy is the keystone of a morally wellordered society. The ontological and axiological commitment to
individual autonomy that informs liberalism and liberal feminism tends
to issue in a morality of rights. In addition to being the source of later
feminisms,24 the great contribution of.liberal feminism has been its
insistence that a political system that protects the interests of men but not
of women will not bear moral scrutiny.
D. PostliberalFeminisms and the Feminist Social Justice Approach
Common to postliberal feminist positions is the rejection of the liberal
ontology of the person as we have sketched it, and, with it, the liberal's
extreme emphasis on individual liberty to the exclusion of values such as
the nurturing of individuals and communities, the sustaining of relationships, the relief of suffering, and attention to appropriate substantive
equality. In rejecting liberal feminism, postliberal feminists contend that
liberal feminism has committed itself to a morality which emphasizes
separation between persons rather than the connections and interdependencies between persons.25 In other words, the charge is that liberal
feminists have, with liberals, committed themselves to what Alison Jaggar
' These commitcalls "normative dualism"26 and "political solipsism."27
2
'
ments together lead to "political skepticism" and, hence, the liberal's
(1981).
24

See EIsENSTEIN, supra note 23.

See JAGGAR, supra note 19.
Normative dualism is the view that what is especially valuable about
human beings is their "mental" capacity for rationality. Id.
27 Political solipsism is the view that human beings are essentially solitary
or isolated, self-sufficient entities, with interests and needs essentially different
and separate from, and often in opposition to, those of others. Id.
28 Political skepticism is the view that questions pertaining to the well-being
of individuals can have no common answers. Id.
25

26
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placing an inordinate premium on the liberty of this rational, autonomous,
solitary person to be and do what he or she desires.29
Postliberal feminists join in departing from the liberal's and liberal
feminist's commitment to this atomistic view of persons and tend to insist
that persons "arrive" in the world already inextricably imbedded in webs
of relationships - in social contexts that in great part determine who they
are and what they will become as individuals, as well as where their
responsibilities will lie. The rejection here is of what is known as
"abstract individualism,"3 which treats persons for the purposes of
political theory as individuals abstracted out of all social contexts. This
abstraction is a familiar theme in the works of John Locke, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and other
liberal moral and political theorists, but it fails to describe real persons.
Rather, postliberal feminists conceive of persons more like knots in a net
than like discrete balls that might be contained in a net - there is no knot
in a net without connections to other knots.
This is the ontology of persons that the postliberal feminist position
shares with communitarianism. But this feminist position is not directly
subject to the central moral objection that liberals commonly bring
against communitarians, namely, that they reject individual liberty as a
central moral value. When the postliberal feminist challenges abstract
individualism and the concept of autonomy as they work in liberal theory,
she is concerned not to totally disregard the moral importance of
individual liberty, but to direct attention to the real lives of real women
with all the substantial impingements on liberty that characterize those
lives. She wants to lay bare the social realities of women's lives that
expose as mythology the doctrine of full autonomy upon which liberal
theory rests. She wants society to see that characteristically male lives (in
United States society, particularly economically privileged, white male
lives) tend to fit the ontological assumptions of liberalism far better than
characteristically female lives (particularly the lives of working class and
poor non-white women). If we look carefully at our major social
institutions and the social positions to which the most substantial social,
political, and economic benefits attach, we shall find (virtually invariably)
that they are structured by men, that their standards for success and

29 JAGGAR, supra note 19, at 40-42;
30 Naomi Scheman, Individualism

see also TONG, supra note 21, at 35.
and the Objects of Psychology, in

DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECrIvES ONEPISTEMOLOGY, METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).

225 (Sandra Harding &
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reward in one way or another promote dominance and competition as
fundamental values, and that those standards for success and reward often
presume as the norm and best suit the realities of life for (particularly
relatively privileged, white) men. 1
For example, the expectations of the professional in the contemporary
university, the contemporary corporation, or the professions of law and
medicine are typically set by men and most easily met by men - men
who are free to concentrate on their professional lives, often (indeed,
usually) with women in the background to manage their households and
serve as primary care providers for their children. 32 Privileged men have
been the generators of liberalism and its individualistic ontology of
persons. It cannot seriously be considered coincidental that men, who are
so often most free to function autonomously (that is, relatively unimpaired by the requirements of households, children, and community) are
also the primary creators and administrators of contemporary institutions
that encourage an emphasis on extreme individualism, productivity, and
competition between persons rather than an emphasis on community,
nurturing, and connectedness between persons - an emphasis that is
common - indeed, generally necessary - in characteristically female
lives. 3
These are among the hidden dimensions and implications of
liberalism that the postliberal feminist seeks to reveal. Her purpose is to
show that moral considerations other than just individual liberty should
command our uncompromising allegiance. This is because the focus on
individual liberty in liberalism, from its inception, detracts from concern
for recognizing the basic moral equality of all persons by favoring those

No claims about essentialism are presumed here. The point is just that
men's lives commonly have certain characteristics, women's lives commonly
have certain characteristics, and that these common characteristics are not the
same for men and women. This point is compatible with essentialism, nominalism, and positionalism. For a number of views on sexual difference, see
31

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE

(Deborah L. Rhode ed.,

1990). For a discussion of difference more generally, see MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW(1990).

32 This is an example of what we mean by a feature common to "characteristically male lives" - men commonly have spouses who bear primary
responsibility for households and child care; women commonly do not.
33 For just one discussion of how the features of characteristically male
lives press away from nurturing, community, and connectedness, see Annette
Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231 (1986).
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whose lives best match the liberal ontology of persons. Concerned about
individual liberty, then, the postliberal feminist is also concerned about
individual welfare and about the dismantling of systems that serve the
welfare of some while ignoring the welfare, substantive freedom, and
equitable treatment of others. The notion of respect for persons that so
deeply informs liberal theory is construed more broadly on these accounts
- respecting another person is not just limited to leaving her alone;
respecting another person involves attending to the conditions that are
necessary for her thriving. And it also means seeing that she has equally
available to her the basic conditions of meaningful self-direction. On
these accounts, then, liberalism's emphasis on individual liberty and, in
particular, its conceptualization of individual liberty as negative liberty or
noninterference, leads to the creation and continuation of social and
political structures that do not take seriously enough the moral equality
of all persons, regardless of their social location.
E. Liberalismas a Conservative Social and PoliticalTheory
It is important to emphasize that feminists who reject liberalism as
inadequate to address important questions of equity, need not fail to see
the crucial contributions of liberal theory as it emerged in the West.
Liberalism, compared to the systems against which it developed in
reaction (feudalism, absolutism, aristocracy, and traditional patriarchy),
is an enormous moral achievement, and feminists generally recognize
this. The problem is that liberalism has exhausted its progressive
potential. An alternative social and political theory needs to be developed
to address the substantive questions of maldistribution of power among
moral equals, an issue which liberalism has been unable to address.34
Though once progressive because of its insistence on greater freedom and
inclusion, liberalism today is conservative in the sense that it preserves
the selective inclusion with which liberalism began, leaving intact systems
that continue to subordinate some groups to others.
II. CONCERNS ABOUT HARM
It is a feature of traditional liberal rhetoric that the only ground on
which the state might interfere with the liberty of individuals is to prevent

34 See, e.g., ELIZABETH FRAZER & NICOLA LACEY, THE POLITICS OF
COMMUNITY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL-COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE

ch. 3 (1993).
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harm. The classic statement of this view, of course, is in John Stuart
Mill's On Liberty.35 Although Mill is a Utilitarian and Locke is a rightsbased theorist, Utilitarians such as Mill share with Lockeans an atomistic
ontology of persons. In Mill's theory, this ontology is combined with a
psychology that leads to the claim that happiness must be the fundamental
ground of morality, and the general happiness the fundamental ground of
the just state. According to Mill, in order for this to be achieved, people
must be left as free as possible. 6 Stated in other terms, this view
requires that individuals not be interfered with except to prevent
(unjustifiable) harm to others.
This tenet of liberal theory informs one objection that has been raised
against a feminist social justice approach to reproduction-assisting
technologies. The most thorough treatment to date of the liberal position
on these technologies has been offered by John Robertson. 3 ' An
objection he brings against feminist social justice approaches is that the
harms that feminists argue are associated with reproduction-assisting
technologies are merely symbolic - they are not real, tangible harms.
Thus, for example, Robertson says feminist concerns that contract
motherhood arrangements commodify women and children amount to no
more than "a perception of the symbolic effects of treating gestation as

31 JOHN

S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 126

(Mary Warnock ed., 1974) (1859).
36

See JOHN S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 37-41 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971)

(1861), where he argues that human beings are constructed psychologically so
that the only thing we can recognize as intrinsically good is happiness. Since we
cannot recognize anything else as being good in itself, and since "ought" implies
"can," the only reasonable ground for morality is the production of happiness.
By parity of reasoning, the only justification for state authority is the production
of happiness. Since everyone counts as one and no more than one, and since the
community/citizenry is no more than the sum of its parts, the state should select
that set of rules and practices (including that set of laws) which will tend to
produce the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number. Mill also holds
that each individual will (in general) be the best judge of his or her own interest
and happiness. Thus, people should be left free to govern their own lives, and
should be limited only to prevent them from harming others. For Mill, too, then,
atomistic individualism leads to a political theory that emphasizes individual
liberty. Liberalism as we understand it here, and as it is commonly understood
in political theory, includes both rights-based theorists such as Locke and goalbased theorists such as Mill. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
31 ROBERTSON, supra note 8.
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a product to be sold for money."3 There are at least three problems
lurking in this logical woodpile.
A.

Harm as the Only Morally Relevant Concern

The first problem with liberal arguments such as Robertson's is that
they presume, without argument, that interferences with individual liberty
can only be justified if they are undertaken to prevent harm to others.
This is certainly what Mill explicitly committed himself to in On Liberty
when he said that "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
'
to prevent harm to others."39
But political theorists know that Mill
himself departed from this "one very simple principle,"4 even within
On Liberty.
Even if Mill had not so departed from the harm principle, moral
agents in contemporary society simply do not accept the harm principle.
That is, the prevention of harm does not constitute the only justificationfor any interference with individual liberty. Consider, for example,
mandatory education, mandatory payment into social security, or property
laws that disallow someone's use of another's property, even though that
use would not in any way harm the owner (e.g., a homeless person's
sleeping during winter in someone's unoccupied summer cottage, perhaps
leaving it in better condition than she found it). Society allows all sorts
of interferences with individual liberty for reasons other than the
prevention of harm; in particular, restraints on liberty are allowed for
reasons having to do with the public good and the protection of rights,
irrespective of considerations of harm. Therefore, liberals cannot simply
presume that the prevention of harm is the only reason that could justify
restricting the development, application, and/or acceptance of reproduction-assisting technologies.4 ' There may be other sound policy reasons
3

Id. at 141. Liberal feminist law professor Lori Andrews makes a similar
claim regarding a number of the arguments that feminists have used to argue for
the moral unacceptability of commercial so-called surrogate mother arrangements. See Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for
Feminists, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 171-78
(Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
"'Mill, supra note 35, at 135.
40 1d.

4' Liberals do not take this rhetoric to heart, either; Robertson himself

disallows certain uses of reproductive technologies for what he would have to
term "symbolic" reasons. ROBERTSON, supra note 8.
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for introducing some restrictions on these practices. That much said,
however, it needs to be pointed out that feminist social justice proponents
generally are not subject to the objection that they support interference
with individual liberty in most of these matters.
B. Interfering with Liberty: A Bright Red Herring
Liberals such as Robertson make the (unacceptable) claim that only
prevention of harm can justify interference with individual liberty. 42 But
more often than not, feminists simply are not arguing for interference
with individual liberty. Virtually all existing versions of a feminist social
justice approach would allow access to anyone desiring to use reproduction-assisting technologies. Much of the feminist discussion on reproduction-assisting technologies can be understood as engagement in moral
suasion. Even though many feminists disagree with the development and
deployment of reproduction-assisting technologies, ranging from IVF to
contract motherhood, few argue that it should be illegal for individuals
to develop, apply, and/or personally use these methodologies. In general,
the objection that feminist social justice theorists are calling for severe
interferences with reproductive liberty attacks a "straw man." Although
a number of postliberal feminists have argued for a prohibition on
brokering commercial surrogacy contracts and for the courts' refusal to
enforce these contracts,43 the argument for prohibition of brokering
commercial surrogacy contracts is a far cry from the claim that all such
arrangements should be absolutely prohibited by law, which would make
individual parties who set up nonenforceable forms of these arrangements
liable to legal sanction. No feminist that we have read has supported this
position. To argue that the development and deployment of these
technologies are harmful to women and children (which feminists have
frequently argued and which we shall argue in a moment) is not
equivalent to arguing that the development, application, or use of any of
these methodologies should be prohibited by law. Discussions, such as
Robertson's, 4 that present the position of feminist social justice theorists
this way grossly misrepresent most versions of this kind of position.

42

See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.

41 See, e.g., OvERALL,

supra note 9; CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 111-36 (1987); MargaretRadin,

Market Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1921-36 (1987).
44 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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C. Symbolic Versus Tangible Harms
The final problem with the liberal position on the matter of harm is
that it characterizes the harms of concern to feminist social justice
theorists as merely symbolic. First, by characterizing the harms at issue
as "symbolic," liberals try to do away with a problem by manipulating
the label for it. "Symbolic" harms, by definition, are not real harms. But
the harms that concern feminist social justice theorists are very real. That
they are often insidious makes them no less tangible.
The harms that concern feminist social justice theorists are those that
result from deeply entrenched, continuing social centrisms, such as
racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, heterosexism, classism, ableism, and
ageism. Who could reasonably deny that in a society where women still
do noi receive pay equal to men's for the same work,45 women are not
harmed by institutions and practices that contribute to their subordinate
position to men? Who could reasonably deny that people of color are
harmed by their systemic exclusion from the social, political, and
economic mainstream? Who could reasonably deny that when our public
spaces are inaccessible to those who are not of "normal" ability that such
people are deprived of important goods available to the rest of us - that
is, they are harmed? Who could reasonably deny that gay men and
lesbians are harmed by social systems that refuse to assure them the same'
protections and benefits that are provided for heterosexuals? That we
cannot say in advance what precise individual will suffer what precise
harm is not a reason to deny that the harms in question are real harms.
Women are harmed by attitudes, institutions, and practices that serve
to keep women in a position subordinate to the position of men. Insofar
as reproduction-assisting technologies contribute to the subordinate
position of women, they are harmful. There is nothing symbolic about
that. Feminists have extensively argued that reproduction-assisting
technologies do contribute to the subordination of women by continuing
to tie the value of women to reproduction. The point is that if a system
serves to privilege members of some groups over members of others, the
system harms those in the subordinate groups. Because reproductionassisting technologies contribute to the privileging of some over others,
then, they are harmful. And the concrete harms associated with subordination of groups in our society are substantial. Therefore, even if it were
the case that prevention of harm alone could justify restrictions on

4'Grace

Schneider, Women to Raise Financial Fists for Equal Pay,
COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville), Oct. 29, 1995, at B1.
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individual liberty, feminist social justice theorists have (and have used)
an argument based on tangible harm to deploy against the development,
application, and personal use of reproduction-assisting technologies.
Indeed, the moral centerpiece of feminist social justice approaches to
reproduction-assisting technologies is that these technologies privilege
some (namely, well-off white men) over others, and that they are,
therefore, harmful in virtue of this contribution to a system of social
subordination.
D. ContemporaryLiberalismas a DeontologicalTheory
There is a final point which needs to be made about the liberal
objection that feminist social justice theorists are concerned only about
symbolic harms. This view is sometimes expressed as a complaint about
"deontological ... reverence," to use the words of John Robertson.46
This is a strange objection, however, coming from a rights-based liberal
theorist such as Robertson. Robertson's own liberal view begins with a
rock-bottom commitment to strong moral rights, especially the right of
individuals to be at liberty. In making moral rights foundational to
morality and the construction of a just society, contemporary liberals
follow Locke rather than Mill, who espoused a goal-based view of
rights.47 Robertson's approach to rights follows that put forward by
Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin asserts that basic moral rights have priority
over ends-based considerations. Thus, Dworkin holds that whenever
moral rights come into play, they "trump" other considerations." This
is precisely the language Robertson uses throughout his discussions of
reproductive liberty; but such a view is paradigmatically deontological.
Deontological views are conceptually opposed to teleological views.
The deontologist denies the teleologist's claim that consequences (real or
probable) are the whole of the moral story. Some deontologists (Kant, for
example) hold that consequences never affect the moral value or disvalue
John A. Robertson, The Rightness of Rights Analysis: A Response to
Dorothy Roberts, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1023, 1027 (1995).
17 Lockean liberalism is a rights-based view; that is, this form
of liberalism
takes strong moral rights to be foundational. Millean liberalism, on the other
hand, is a goal-based view: it recognizes rights only insofar as they are thought
to maximize the general good. Thus, from Mill's Utilitarian viewpoint, rights are
not foundational - they are derivative from utility. This makes for crucial
differences in these classical liberal views. Most contemporary liberals are of the
rights-based variety.
41 See, e.g., RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 259-65 (1978).
46
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of an action (or practice). Others admit consequences as morally relevant
considerations; they just deny that consequences alone invariably
determine the rightness or wrongness of actions and/or practices. And so
it is that rights-based moral theorists are deontologists, since they hold
that rights, rather than consequences, sit at the foundations of morality
and must sit at the foundations of a just society. Feminist social justice
theorists are concerned that social and political systems take seriously the
moral equality of persons. Such concerns are, by their very nature,
deontological. But that is no criticism of them, particularly from a rightsbased perspective. To place the liberty of individuals at the foundations
of morality and the just state is equally deontological; and so complaints
about "deontological reverences" are applicable (if they are applicable at
all) to rights-based liberal views, such as Robertson's itself.
Our general points on the matter of harm, then, are these: (1)
considerations other than harm should command our moral allegiance and
may justify interference with individual liberty; (2) feminist social justice
theorists generally do not argue for interference with individual liberty as
regards reproduction-assisting technologies, except in the case of
brokering contract mother arrangements, which a number of feminists
have argued should not be lawful; and (3) individuals suffer very real and
substantial harms by being in socially subordinate positions; thus any
practices that contribute to the subordination of some groups by others
are harmful. Since reproduction-assisting technologies contribute to a
system of social subordination they are harmful.
I. THE MYTH OF LIBERAL NEUTRALrrY
AND THE MATrER OF HARM REVISITED
A.

The Charge of Legal Moralism

Liberals also object to a feminist social justice approach on the
ground that it is a form of legal moralism. The rhetoric of liberal political
theory requires that the government remain neutral among competing
conceptions of morality to protect citizens against the imposition of state
orthodoxy. Liberals therefore try to "set aside or 'bracket' controversial
moral and religious conceptions for purposes of justice."4 9 The liberal
notion of procreative liberty allows each individual to choose her own
moral understanding of procreation for herself, so long as she causes no

49 Michael J. Sandel, MoralArgumentandLiberal Toleration:Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REv. 521, 521 (1989).
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harm to others. The United States Supreme Court applies this approach
to questions of reproductive rights, defending the right to an abortion as
an aspect of "freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life
"50

Under this view, a feminist social justice approach to assisted
reproduction improperly reflects a particular moral view about reproduction which individuals in a pluralistic society should remain free to reject.
Liberals understand the feminist concern that contract pregnancy
arrangements devalue women's role in reproduction, for example, as a
moral position that is entitled to no more government deference than the
moral position that these arrangements further women's autonomy. As
Robertson explains, "reasonable people have different moral perceptions
about paid surrogacy, with many not finding the symbolic demeaning of
motherhood that others see as so glaringly wrong."'" By asking the
government to choose between these competing moral views, liberals
argue, feminists violate the neutrality requirement.
Liberals, of course, must demonstrate that their notion of procreative
freedom does not rely on similar moral judgments. This is attempted by
trying to distinguish between personal conceptions of morality that are
irrelevant to government decisionmaking and tangible harms to individuals, which may properly be weighed against procreative interests. This
distinction, however, cannot withstand careful scrutiny, for liberal
defenses of procreative liberty reduce to a moral position about the value
of procreation.
The primacy liberals accord procreation, based partly on the
importance to personal identity of genetic transmission, reflects a
particular and contested view of reproduction. Liberals contend that
procreative liberty deserves privileged status because of its importance to
personal conceptions of identity and the meaning of life. In what sense
is the decision to procreate central to personal identity? Answering this
question involves moral judgments about the meaning and importance of
reproduction.
In responding for liberals, Robertson centers on the human desire for
genetic connection with offspring. Although he concedes that this desire
is at least partly socially constructed, Robertson explains it in biological
terms: "[A]t the most basic level transmission of one's genes through
reproduction is an animal or species urge closely linked to the sex

o Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
supra note 8, at 141.

s ROBERTSON,
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drive."' 2 But, of course, the fact that animals have a natural urge to have
sex in no way whatever entails that they have a natural urge to transmit
their genes. Robertson's claim here is an example of what used to be
called "anthropomorphism," and is now known as an example of "the
social construction of biology."
Further, this belief in the importance of genetic destiny to personal
identity seems to contradict the liberal image of the autonomous, selfchoosing individual. An examination of the role the genetic tie plays in
defining personal identity, creating children, and determining legal
parentage demonstrates the striking indeterminacy of its legal and social
meaning. 3 The importance of genetic relatedness is not determined by
biology, but by culture. Even within our legal system, its meaning varies
depending on the context. Although we generally assume that the genetic
tie creates an enduring bond between parents and their children, the law
often disregards it, for example, in the cases of contract mothers, sperm
donors, and unwed fathers.5"
A comparison of liberals' defense of procreative choices and
feminists' identification of harms reveals a striking similarity in their
moral explanations of the significance of procreation. Consider, for
example, Robertson's refutation of Margaret Radin's argument that paid
pregnancy arrangements commodify women and children. Radin
contends that childbearing should not be traded on the market because
"commodification of women's reproductive capacity is harmful for the
identity aspect of personhood and.., the closeness of paid surrogacy to
baby-selling harms our self-conception too deeply. 5 6 Robertson
criticizes Radin for failing to show why payment for gestation is
Id. at 24. Robertson posits as the motivation for couples' use of infertility
treatment, for example, the frustration of "their normal species urge to
procreate." Id. at 98.
" Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 209, 210
(1995). For another argument contesting the understanding of parenthood based
on genetic relatedness, see ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION
AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING (1993); REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES:
GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987).
" In custody disputes, courts typically discount the contract mother's
genetic claim to legal maternity and the unwed father's genetic claim to legal
paternity in cases where the child's mother is married to another man. In most
states, the sperm donor is not considered the legal father of his genetic offspring.
" See Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice, ProcreativeLiberty, and the
Limits ofLiberalTheory: Robertson'sChildren of Choice, 20 L. & Soc. INQUIRY
1005, 1010-11 (1995).
56 See Radin, supra note 43, at 1932.
52
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particularly objectionable "since one could just as reasonably argue that
the physical and mental attributes that drive the market for models,
professional athletes, and computer scientists are also essential to 'our
deepest understanding of what it is to be human.'"" Yet Robertson
himself rests his defense of paid pregnancy on the view that "procreative
liberty should enjoy presumptive primacy ... because control over
whether one reproduces or not is central to personal identity, to dignity,
and to the meaning of one's life." 8 Although Radin and Robertson
reach opposite conclusions about the implications of reproduction's
importance, they both ultimately rely on a similarly normative conception
of procreation.
Liberals' contention that their concept of procreation does not serve
to limit the reproductive choices of some individuals (as the feminist
social justice approach purportedly does) is also erroneous. Despite their
rhetoric, most liberals would probably concede that there must be some
limits to the use of reproduction-assisting technologies, even in the
absence of a showing of tangible harm to another individual. For
example, should procreative liberty permit a parent to clone her offspring,
creating an exact genetic replica of another human genome? The only
way to restrict such practices is to resort to some moralistic judgment
about the proper use of these technologies. Thus, Robertson posits "a core
view of the goals and values of reproduction" that encompasses only
"actions designed to enable a couple to have normal, healthy offspring
whom they intend to rear." 9 Robertson, therefore, opposes cloning and
the use of prenatal genetic screening to produce a disabled child.60
Procreative liberty does not protect these insidious forms of selection of
offspring characteristics, according to Robertson, because they "pass
beyond the central experiences of identity and meaning that make
reproduction a valued experience., 61 But liberals' own argument from
their core understanding of reproduction rests on a fundamental moral
position about the proper role of reproduction.
In short, liberals such as Robertson rely on conceptions of reproduction to outweigh individuals' interest in personal choice that are no less

"

ROBERTSON,

8d. at 24.

supra note 8, at 142.

IId. at 167.
Id. at 171 (Robertson refers to the use of genetic testing to produce a
disabled child as "intentional diminishment." As an example of intentional
diminishment, Robertson offers a set of hypothetical deaf parents who wish to
use genetic screening to ensure that their child will also be deaf.).
61 Id. at 169.
61
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"moralistic" than feminist social justice approaches. Recognizing the
impossibility of avoiding these moral questions demolishes liberals'
repudiation of feminist criticism of unlimited procreative liberty on the
ground that it reflects a moral perspective.
B. Liberal Inequality
Moreover, liberals' exclusion of social justice concerns on the ground
that they constitute legal moralism does not promote government
neutrality as liberals claim. Liberals defend the bracketing of moral
arguments as a prerequisite for neutral government decisionmaking with
respect to individuals' personal choices. But liberalism in practice tends
to favor the choices of the privileged and to maintain current distributions
of wealth and power. This bias is reflected, for example, in liberals'
resolution of disputes between couples and birth mothers who have
entered into paid pregnancy contracts. When a birth mother decides she
does not wish to relinquish her child, both sides have procreative interests
at stake. But liberals insist on the enlistment of the government's
affirmative assistance in enforcing paid pregnancy contracts to protect the
wealthier and more powerful contracting man's interest in having a
genetically-related child. Thus, enforcing these contracts would establish
in advance of any particular case the state's unequivocal preference for
the reproductive interests of contracting men over contracted women. 62
Further, courts in our existing liberal society are far more likely to
recognize the rights of married couples to use reproduction-assisting
technologies to create or complete nuclear families than to uphold their
use by single heterosexual women, lesbians, or gay men. 63 The disproportionate use of these technologies by white people, despite higher
infertility rates among people of color, suggests as well the probability of
racial bias in fertility and genetic counselling.'
See, e.g., Joan C. Callahan, ProcreativeLiberty: Whose Reproduction?
Whose Liberty?, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 121, 121-25 (1995).
63 See, e.g., MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 116-21 (1988);
Joan C. Callahan, The ContractMotherhood Debate, 4 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 82
(1993); Roberts, The Genetic Tie, supra note 53, at 252-57; Carol Smart, "There
Is of Course the Distinction Dictated by Nature": Law and the Problem of
62

Paternity, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND
MEDICINE 98 (Michelle Stanworth ed., 1987).

' Patricia A. King, The Pastas Prologue:Race, Class and Gene Discrimination, in GENE MAPPING: USING LAW AND ETHICS AS GuIDES 94, 103 (George
J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) (suggesting that the racial disparity in the
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The choices of the poor and people of color (and, particularly,
women in these groups), on the other hand, often remain unfulfilled or
even overridden under liberal notions of procreative liberty. Liberal
theory offers no support to people who cannot afford the cost of
reproductive health services. Nor does liberal theory necessarily recognize
as state intrusion conditions placed on government benefits to poor
women that restrict their reproductive decisions. Liberal theory leaves
market biases to operate freely against less powerful groups because these
forces do not constitute state interference with procreative choices. Thus,
in the case of abortion, liberal theory, with its noninterference interpretation of liberty, can (and does) allow the state to refuse to make abortion
services available to all women who need those services to safely exercise
their choice not to reproduce. The liberals' formal understanding of
political freedom as noninterference with seeking an abortion is a
virtually meaningless freedom for a woman who cannot afford to
purchase a safe procedure. In just this sort of way, liberal theory protects
the interests of the economically privileged while ignoring meaningful
freedom for the least well off.
C. Harm Revisited
Having established that liberals' core view of reproduction has no
presumptive advantage over one that takes into account social justice
concerns, we may turn again to the harms that are at the center of
feminist concerns. A feminist social justice approach understands the
value of procreation and the harms stemming from reproduction-assisting
technologies in their social surroundings. Such an approach recognizes
that it is impossible to comprehend the welfare of individuals apart from
the context of their social positions. This perspective contrasts markedly
with the liberal presumption that individuals' procreative choices may be
isolated from unjust social structures. Individuals are not atomistic beings
who create their identities, make choices, and determine their interests
apart from their specific communities and general social locations. An
individual's ability to make autonomous decisions is circumscribed by the
use of clinical genetic services may be related to physician referrals); Laurie
Nsiah-Jefferson & Elaine J. Hall, Reproductive Technology: Perspectivesand
Implications for Low-Income Women and Women of Color, in HEALING
TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 93, 95-102, 109-11 (Kathryn S. Ratcliff
et al. eds., 1989) (discussing barriers that restrict access by poor women and
women of color to genetic counselling and reproduction-assisting technologies).
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material conditions of her life, including her social position and group
membership; her social location helps to determine her life prospects.
Membership in a dominant group affords an automatic privilege, while
membership in a subordinate group materially harms people.65 The harm
of membership in a subordinate group is manifested in countless ways
and reflected in a myriad of statistics. The inferior social position of
women, generally, and black women, in particular, exemplify the harm
caused by unjust social structures.
Women experience more poverty and violence in their homes than
men because of their gender. A labor market and system of child care
structured against working mothers leads to increasingly high rates of
female poverty.6 6 The proportion of poor white families maintained by
women rose from twenty percent in 1959 to forty-two percent in 1987.67
Over one-half of black families headed by women live in poverty; and
black families headed by women are three times as likely to be poor or
near poor than those with an adult male present. 6' Experts estimate that
half of all married women will be beaten by their husbands at some point
in their marriage.69 Between fifteen and forty percent of all women are
victims of attempted or completed rapes, most committed by acquaintances.70 Who could reasonably deny that these are real, tangible harms?
Consider homosexual people as a subordinated group. Gay men and
lesbians are increasingly victims of hate crimes, perpetrated by straight
white men." It is currently thought that thirty percent of gay male and
lesbian teenagers attempt suicide, with their sexual orientation a major

See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707
(1993) (discussing the concept of whiteness as a form of property that brings
with 66
it benefits and privileges ratified by law).
See generallyMARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
67 Audrey Rowe, The Feminization of Poverty: An Issue for the 90's, 4
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 73, 74 (1991).
61 Margaret C. Simms, Black Women Who Head Families: An Economic
Struggle, in SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN
65

141, 69143 (Margaret C. Simms & Julianne M. Malveaux eds., 1986).
LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 19 (1979); Martha R.

Mahoney, LegalImages ofBatteredWomen: Redefining the Issue ofSeparation,
90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
70 CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA 3-5

(1992).

7' KendallThomas, BeyondthePrivacyPrinciple,92 COLUM. L. REv. 1431,

1462 (1992).
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causal factor.72 Who could reasonably deny that these are real, tangible
harms?
Blacks, too, continue to be victims of hate crimes; and despite
decades of civil rights struggle, blacks in America still occupy a social
position drastically inferior to that of whites. For example, blacks are
twice as likely to be unemployed and three times more likely to be poor
than whites. 3 Black infants, half of whom are born into poverty, die at
a rate twice that of whites, and overall life expectancy is significantly
lower for blacks than for whites. 4 Who could reasonably deny that
these are real, tangible harms?
This social positioning is buttressed by negative cultural images that
affect how others view and treat members of these groups, even
unconsciously.75 Although we may not be able to predict the precise
harm a particular individual will suffer because of group membership, we
have more than ample evidence to show that all members of subordinated
groups are worse off than they would be if the group were not oppressed.
This is the result of subordination: the life prospects of the subordinated
never equal those of the privileged, dominant group.76 Since people in
these groups are worse off than they would be without social dominance
and social subordination, even the Lockean must agree that they are
harmed.
The claim that reproduction-assisting technologies contribute to the
subordinate status of oppressed groups is, then, a claim of tangible harm.
A feminist social justice approach recognizes that policies governing
procreation not only affect individual interests; they also shape the way
we value the members of social groups. Trading genetic material and
women's reproductive capacity on the market misvalues women's
reproductive labor, exalts the importance of genetic relatedness, and

See, e.g., Chris Bull, Suicidal Tendencies: Is Anguish over Sexual
Orientation Causing Gay and Lesbian Teens to Kill Themselves?, ADVOCATE,
Apr. 5, 1994, at 34-42.
" David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans:
"Permanent"Poverty and Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 25
(1991).
74 Mortality Patterns- United States, 1992 from the Centersfor Disease
Control and Prevention, 273 JAMA 100 (1995).
"'See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection:
Reckoningwith UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (demonstrating the prevalence of unconscious racism).
716Id. at 326.
72

1995-96]

A FEmINIST SOCIAL JUSTICE APPROACH

1221

devalues the genetic contribution of people of color. It therefore
reinforces gender, class, and racial inequality.
For these reasons, feminist social justice approaches call for the
inclusion of harms arising from unjust social relationships in deliberations
about the government's role in the development and use of reproductionassisting technologies. Feminists need not abandon, however, the liberal
concern about government abuse of power and the danger to individual
autonomy posed by legislative majorities. We may be willing to permit
certain harms because attempting to prevent them would itself be
substantially more harmful. The degree of government intrusion into
individuals' procreative decisions required to regulate every use of
reprodiaction-assisting technologies may itself be too great a harm to
justify this regulation. Thus, as we pointed out earlier, a feminist social
justice approach need not support the absolute prohibition of noncoital
means of reproduction. But such an approach means to make clear that
insofar as these means of reproduction add to the privileging of men over
women, the privileging of white people over people of color, the
privileging of heterosexual people over homosexual people, the privileging of the economically well-off over the poor, and the commodification
of children, these means are harmful and they should not be endorsed or
in any way supported by a government that purports to take the interests
of all its citizens equally seriously. Part of what this means is that no
public monies should be expended on the development of these technologies unless they are equally available to all citizens, and "contracts" for
so-called surrogate motherhood arrangements should not be enforceable.
IV.

CONCERNS ABOUT EXPLOrATIoN AND VOLUNTARINESS

Liberals also challenge the feminist contention that "contracts" for socalled surrogate motherhood arrangements should not be enforced because
they are demeaning to women. Once again, Robertson serves as an
example when he argues that if a birth mother in one of these arrangements wishes to keep the child, "[p]rivileging the surrogate's wishes over
the reliance wishes of the couple assumes that women cannot make
rational decisions about reproduction and child rearing prior to conception." 7 Ruth Macklin makes the same objection, saying that "[f]eminists
who oppose surrogacy presume to speak for all women. But what they
are really saying is that those who elect to enter surrogacy arrangements

" ROBERTSON,

supra note 8, at 132.
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are incompetent to choose and stand in need of protection."7' Versions
of this argument have been put forward by liberal feminists as well, for
example, Lori Andrews, Barbara Berg, and Christine Sistare.79
But this objection is just too quick. First, worries about exploitation
in contract pregnancy arrangements need not come from some particularly
feminist view. They may come from a certain view of the power
differentiations between races, ethnic groups, and classes that pays no
special attention to the position of women as such. Second, anyone who
opposes these arrangements need not hold that women entering into them
are incompetent to make such judgments for themselves and need not
hold that these women need special protection because of some special
vulnerability.
A.

Exploitation

It is often argued that contract pregnancies are likely to exploit poor
women, and particularly poor women of color. But it needs to be
remembered that in general, at least, it is acceptable to select public
policies that attempt to limit the activities of exploiters, even if fully
competent people might choose to be exploitees. That is, one may
coherently argue that the state's enforcement of these arrangements
contributes substantially to societal attitudes toward women and children
that simply ought not to be encouraged, in general, and ought not to be
encouraged by the state, in particular. Such an argument undermines
Macklin's claims that "the feminist charge that the practice of surrogacy
exploits women is paternalistic"8 and "the charge of exploitation
contradicts the moral stance that women have the ability and the right to
control their own bodies."'" After all, jurisdictions commonly refuse to
allow people to assent to being maimed or to engage in dueling, even
though people might make such assents voluntarily.
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EthicalAnalysis,in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 136, 141

(Larry Gostin ed., 1990).
" Andrews, supra note 38; Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the
Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERsPECTIVES 80
(Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995); Christine T. Sistare, Reproductive Freedom and
Women 's Freedom: Surrogacy and Autonomy, 19 PHIL. F. 227 (1988).
80 Macklin, supra note 78, at 141.
81 Id.
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Christine Overall makes one version of this feminist social justice
argument to Canadians with regard to commercial forms of these
arrangements:
Merely mitigating the exploitive aspects of contract motherhood while
making it legal begs the general question whether the practice as a
whole is justified, whether the Canadian state should be fostering the
work of women as breeders and whether this is a "job" for women that
Canadian society should endorse and support through state mechanisms.
The legalization of contract motherhood would present reproduction for
money as an acceptable, even desirable, aspect of women's place in
Canadian society. But this path is incompatible with the vision of
women as equal, autonomous, and valued members of this culture! 2
Similarly, Joan Mahoney provides a non-paternalistic argument for
nonenforcement by showing the problems with the law's requiring
specific performance of terms governing a woman's conduct during a
contract pregnancy and requiring relinquishment of a child after birth.83
Since liberals often argue for the enforcement of contract motherhood
arrangements on the ground of an analogy to sperm "donation," Mahoney
distinguishes genetic and gestational mothers: she argues that women who
donate oocytes are analogous to sperm donors, but that these donors are
not analogous to women who carry pregnancies to term, and that the law
should not treat gestational mothers as analogous to gamete providers
who do not participate in gestation.84 Refusing to enforce an agreement
to relinquish parental rights of a gestational mother, then, does not
constitute a worrisome kind of special treatment for women. Using
several precedents in labor law, Mahoney argues that precluding
gestational contract mothers from contracting away their parental rights
amounts to just one more provision among many that restrict the freedom
of employees. The fact that only women can become pregnant does not
mean that such restrictions treat women as less competent and more in
need of protection from their decisions than men.
At the same time, Mahoney argues that men and women are different
in some important ways, and that justice might well require recognizing

82
83

Overall, supra note 9, at 131.
Joan Mahoney, An Essay on Surrogacy and Feminist Thought, in
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1990).
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some of these differences. That women alone can be and are gestational
mothers may make a difference that is appropriately recognized in law."
Following feminist jurists such as Ruth Colker, Ann Scales, and
Catharine MacKinnon, Mahoney distinguishes what she calls the "antisubordination perspective" from what she calls the "equality model"
found in liberal feminist positions like Lori Andrews', which include the
worry that special treatment of women in these arrangements (i.e., by
nonenforcement) will only work against women. 86 The anti-subordination perspective that Mahoney takes asks whether the policy or practice
in question helps to maintain an underclass based on gender. If the law's
refusal to recognize gestational mothers' prenatal contracts to relinquish
parental rights helps do away with the second-class status of women
generally, then feminists should support nonenforcement of these
contracts.
B.

Voluntariness

It is sometimes argued by feminists that contract motherhood
arrangements should not be enforced because women cannot voluntarily
decide before the birth of a child whether they will be willing to give up
that child once it is born. Similar concerns about voluntariness are often
heard in regard to other reproduction-assisting technologies. For example,
it has sometimes been argued that pronatalist attitudes exert a subtle but
extremely strong influence on women to reproduce, and women who have
access to these technologies are under enormous pressure to seek them. 7
The pressure on women to become mothers is so great that some question
Id. at 190.
See id. at 192; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979); Ruth ColkerAntiSubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, and EqualProtection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1003 (1986); Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence:An
Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373 (1986).
85

16

87

See, e.g.,

GENA

COREA, THE MOTHER

MACHINE:

REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS

166-85

(1985); Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift or PatriarchalBargain? Women's Consent
to In Vitro Fertilization in Male Infertility, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN
MEDICAL ETHICS 169 (Helen B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992).
Pronatalism, of course, is not uniform in society. Economically well-off white
women may be pressured by general pronatalist attitudes to seek these technologies, but those general attitudes do not extend to black women or poor women
of any racial or ethnic group.
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whether the decision to use these technologies is a genuinely voluntary
choice."8 Indeed, some views come close to holding that socially
constructed pronatalism is so strong that women, even under typical
conditions that do not require technological assistance, cannot really
choose freely whether to take on motherhood.89
It is important to address these concerns directly. On the one hand,
societal pronatalism for favored groups does result in enormous pressure
on some women to reproduce. There is no question about this. Our
society does not think it is just fine for people to remain single and
childless deliberately or for married people to remain childless deliberately. Infertility is constructed as a nearly unbearable tragedy; deliberate
childlessness is constructed as nearly unimaginable selfishness.9" Under
such conditions, what might be said on the question of voluntariness in
seeking reproductive assistance?
It needs first to be noted that voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing
matter; voluntariness is a characteristic of human activity which admits
of degrees. Further, questions about the voluntariness of an individual's
action are necessarily contextual. For example, the criteria for making an
acceptably voluntary purchase of an automobile are very different from
the criteria for giving an acceptably voluntary consent to a major surgery.
So, highly general discussions of voluntariness will always be limited in
their usefulness, much as highly general discussions of causality are
always limited in their usefulness. For example, Joel Feinberg argues that

the
point of a causal citation is to single out one of the certified causal
candidates that is especially interestingto us, given our various practical
purposes and cognitive concerns .... Explanatory citations single out
abnormal interferences with the normal course of events or hitherto
unknown missing links in a person's understanding. They are designed

s See, e.g., Lorber, supra note 87.
See, e.g., Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism, Pronatalism,and Motherhood,
in MOTHERNG: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 287, 293 (Joyce Trebilcot ed.,
1984).
90 Of course, and as we have mentioned previously, we do not see
proponents of reproductive liberty worrying about the infertility of those who are
not white and/or who are poor. And many of those for whom the society does
not have pronatalist ambitions, particularlyblacks, are in a most peculiar position
- the dominant white society is not invested in the reproduction of blacks, but
a married black couple deliberately childless is even more unthinkable an
instance of selfishness.
89
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simply to remove puzzlement by citing the causal factor that can shed
the most light. Hence we can refer to the criterion of selection in
explanatory contexts (for short) as the lanterncriterion.Causal citations
made from the "engineering standpoint" are made with a view to
farilitating control over future events by citing the most efficiently and
economically manipulable causal factor. The criterion for selection
[here]... can thus be called (for short) the handle criterion.The point
of causal citations in purely blaming contexts is simply to pin the label
of blame on the appropriate factor for further notice and practical use.
These judgments cite a causal factor that is a human act or omission
"stained" (as an ancient figure of speech would have it) with fault. The
criterion [here] ... can be called (for short) the stain criterion. When
we look for "the cause," then, we may be looking for the causal factor
that has either a lantern, a handle or a stain on it.9

There is, then, no such thing as "the cause" which can be cited in any
case independent of purpose and context. In much the same way, there
is no such thing as a completely free action. Indeed, any action that was
completely free or uninfluenced would be completely random, and this
is surely not what we mean by voluntary human action. Analogous to
making an appropriate causal citation, whether an action is to be
considered appropriately or acceptably voluntary will necessarily be a
function of our purposes and the context of the action.
Suppose our purpose in asking about the voluntariness of a woman's
choice in seeking reproduction assistance is to decide whether she ought
to be prevented from obtaining assistance. When we are talking about
voluntariness from the perspective of potential interference, we need to
ask what is at stake and whether someone has viable alternatives.
Pronatalist attitudes certainly do put pressure on women to seek assistance
in reproducing; but the pressure here is not analogous to compulsion
(e.g., being swept up and carried off) or coercion (e.g., being forced at
gunpoint). In cases of genuine compulsion or coercion, it would be
completely unreasonable to expect someone to resist, either because she
is being overpowered physically or because the threat to her is so
substantial.92 In these cases, it makes sense to say that someone is
completely a victim - that she had no real choice but to "act" as she did.
If our question is whether women should be precluded from seeking
9' JOEL FErNBERG, HARM TO OTHERS
92

177 (1984).

See Joan C. Callahan, Paternalismand Voluntariness, 16 CANADIAN J.

PHIL. 199 (1986).
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reproduction assistance because their choice to do so is unfree in a
pronatalist society like our own, the answer has to be no; such interference would not be justified on the basis of women's choices being unfree
to the relevant degree in the relevant sense.
On the other hand, if our purpose in asking about the voluntariness
of women's seeking reproduction assistance is to determine whether there
are worrisome influences at work that need to be noticed and addressed,
it is reasonable to conclude that pronatalist social attitudes do exert a
troubling, often insidious, influence on women's choices to reproduce in
general, and to seek potentially painful, risky, and expensive reproduction
assistance in particular. Feinberg, for example, argues:
[A] person's consent is fully voluntary only when he is a competent and
unimpaired adult who has not been threatened, misled, or lied to about
relevant facts, nor manipulated by subtle forms of conditioning. It is
worth giving emphasis here to two points: that both force and fraud can
invalidate consent, and that "force" can be very subtle indeed.93
Feinberg's use of "scare quotes," of course, is to alert us that "force"
regarding human action is being used here in a way other than its usual
way. The meaning of "force" in this context is not analogous to
"compulsion" or "coercion," but is more like the meaning of "force" in
science, where forces are understood to have greater and lesser power.
The point (for our discussion) is that we all grow up in a society that
subjects us to various subtle forms of conditioning, and, depending on the
force or influence of that conditioning on our actions, the voluntariness
of our choices can be impaired.
When feminists question women's voluntariness in electing reproduction assistance, part of the intent is to direct attention to these subtle
forms of conditioning and to point out that they do raise legitimate
concerns about the reasons women might have for being so intent on
reproducing. One way to put this point is to say that if we did not live in
a society which put such relentless pressure on (at least some) women to
reproduce, we could have complete confidence that a woman's reproductive choices were not the result of manipulation by conditioning, subtle
and often not-so-subtle.
Feminists are also often concerned that women might be misled
regarding the safety and efficacy of some reproduction-assisting
technologies. There are dangers associated with these technologies that

93 FEINBERG,

supra note 91, at 116.
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often go unmentioned. For example, a number of these technologies
involve inducing superovulation, which involves giving high doses of
fertility drugs to perfectly healthy, fertile, fully functional women who
are "donating" eggs for others' use or whose male partners are subfertile.
The long-term effects of superovulation are not known; and egg
collection has led to several deaths and a number of injuries with
potential for causing permanent infertility. There is a grim irony in the
use of procedures that risk the fertility of a healthy woman to assure
reproduction for an infertile or subfertile man or an infertile woman.
It is also the case that the more elaborate and more expensive forms
of these technologies frequently fall, and reporting systems have not
required clear reports of failure rates. Robyn Rowland, for example,
suggests that the most honest and helpful reporting would include failure
rates instead of so-called success rates.94 She discusses a survey of IVF
clinics in America:
Many clinics were quoting a 20 per cent success rate, using what they
saw as the worldwide average; yet of the fifty-four clinics which
responded to the questionnaire, half had never sent a client home with
a baby.. . . Statistics were manipulated, so that some of the so-called
pregnancies were in fact just chemical changes which might or might
not have been an early sign of pregnancy. Hospitals would cite
pregnancies as a success rate, as opposed to live births, and many
hospitals counted their twins and triplets in the reported totals of live
births. Ectopic pregnancies were also rated in the "success" category.
Most clinics use pregnancy rates because these are much higher than the
live birth rates due to the high rates of ectopic pregnancies, stillbirths
and spontaneous abortions.95
One set of recent figures shows that of 19,079 treatment cycles, 16,405
(eighty-six percent) involved successful egg retrievals, 14,150 (seventyfour percent) involved successful transfers leading to 3057 (sixteen
percent) pregnancies, which culminated in 2345 (twelve percent)
deliveries.96 Of these deliveries, 673 (twenty-eight percent) were multi94 ROBYN ROWLAND, LIvING LABORATORIES: WOMEN AND REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES
95 Id.
96 John F.

44 (1992).

Randolph, Jr. (Director of the Division of Reproductive
Endocrinology, Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, University of
Michigan Medical Center), public lecture sponsored by the GTE Foundation
Lectureship Program in Technology and Ethics at Transylvania University (Apr.
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ple gestations.97 If each of these multiple births involved only twins
(which they did not), that would mean that at most 1346 treatment cycles
of 19,079 (seven percent) could be counted as successful.98 On
Rowland's suggestion for giving figures, that's a ninety-three percent
failure rate. The statistics for GIFT and ZIFT are even worse.99 Rowland
puts it baldly: "[I]n any other technological area [this] would be
considered a gross failure and immediately discontinued."' '
Add to this that roughly thirty-five percent of couples "diagnosed" as
infertile ultimately succeed in achieving pregnancy with no treatment,'
and the wisdom of applying these technologies becomes highly questionable, at best. Yet, despite the discomforts, risks, financial costs, and
dismal success'rates of these programs, women who have the financial
means to afford them continue to enroll in them.' If enrolling women
do not understand the failure rates of these programs, their participation
in them is not acceptably voluntary. On the other hand, if women do
understand the high failure rates of these programs, yet they continue to
take on the discomfort, risk, and expense of them, this raises pertinent
questions about their desperation for children genetically connected to
them and/or their male partners as well as questions about the source of
that desperation. We do not want to suggest that women entering these
programs are so desperate that their choices to do so are so involuntary
that they should not be permitted to make these choices, but we do want
to suggest that when a woman is so "desperate" to have a child genetically related to her and/or her partner that she seeks special reproductionassisting services that are painful, often humiliating,103 risky, tremendously expensive, and, at the same time, highly unlikely to yield the child

29, 1993).
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100ROWLAND, supra note
10

94, at 48.

See, e.g., John A. Collins et al., Treatment-independentPregnancyAmong

Infertile Couples, 309 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1201, 1202 (1983).
102 Developers and providers of these technologies continue to utilize public
funds (in the form of research support and the utilization of public facilities, such
as state universities) and to press for private insurance carriers to cover their
costs. At the same time, and not surprisingly, none of these proponents press for
Medicaid or Medicare funding for applying these technologies to those without
the ability to pay for them.
103 See, for example, ROWLAND, supra note 94, at 29-30, who includes
testimony from women who have participated in these programs.

1230

[Vol. 84

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

she seeks, she is acting on a motive that is socially constructed and that
may well compromise the voluntariness of her choice.
Many feminists have argued that the so-called desperation of the
infertile is a social construction. 0 4 Indeed, it is a social construction
twice over. First, women's experience of desperation in wanting a
"genetically appropriate" child is largely the result of social attitudes
toward infertility. Second, even if an infertile woman does not experience
desperation for a "genetically appropriate" child, she is constructed as
desperate and as someone who should be willing to do all that she can to
produce such a child. As Naomi Pfeffer says, "What is required of the
infertile is that they submit in silence to the claim that they are desperate."' °5 The groundwork for such a requirement is clearly laid in liberal
discussions of the value of genetic reproduction, such as John Robertson's, which assume without argument a fundamental connection between
reproduction of one's genes and one's self-identity.'0 6 But this is not a
claim likely to be made by a woman; and it is a claim quite likely to be
rejected by a feminist. Indeed, feminists have often argued that the
emphasis on genetic connections is intimately tied to patriarchy, both
historically and contemporarily,"0 7 particularly in its racist manifestation. ' 8 Women may well be deeply invested in experiencing pregnancy,
childbirth, nursing, and parenting - experiences that accompany ordinary
reproduction in the ordinary way - but this is emphatically not equivalent
to being deeply invested in having a child genetically related to them
and/or their male spouses. The whole emphasis on genetically-related
children that informs Robertson's view, then, is found by social justice
feminists to be suspect as a perspective that is characteristic of women;
and if it is not characteristic of women, this is just one more occasion on

' See, e.g., Naomi Pfeffer, ArtificialInsemination,In-vitroFertilizationand
the Stigma of Infertility, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: GENDER, MOTHERHOOD AND MEDICINE
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1995-961

A FEMINIST SoCIAL JusTICE APPROACH

1231

which liberalism has left out the perspective of women, taking the
perspective of men as the norm.
In sum, then, a feminist social justice approach is an antisubordination perspective that is no more a form of legal moralism than is
liberalism, and a proponent of this perspective can argue against the
deployment of reproduction-assisting technologies and against the state's
enforcing contract motherhood arrangements without assuming that
women are incompetent or in need of special protection simply because
they are women. At the same time, (selective) pronatalism in a society
can and does put women under considerable, if often subtle, pressure to
produce children genetically related to themselves and/or their male
partners. Although this does not render women incompetent to decide
whether to use these technologies, it does raise important questions about
possible compromises of voluntariness on the part of women who seek
these technologies, particularly those technologies that are painful, risky,
very expensive, and highly prone to failure.
CONCLUSION: THE STATE'S PROPER ROLE IN
PROTECING AND ENHANCING PROCREATIVE LIBERTY

The liberal notion of procreative liberty encompasses only the right
against state interference with personal decisions about reproduction. As
we have mentioned, this view follows the prevailing jurisprudence that
the Constitution protects only an individual's "negative" right to be free
from unjustified intrusion, rather than the "positive" right actually to lead
a free life."0 9 Consistent with its predominant concern with government
neutrality, liberal theory does not recognize an affirmative entitlement to
the resources needed to procreate. As Robertson explains, procreative
liberty "means that a person violates no moral duty in making a
procreative choice, and that other persons have a duty not to interfere
with that choice" but "does not imply the duty of others to provide the
resources or services necessary to exercise one's procreative liberty
despite plausible moral arguments for government assistance." ' 0 Thus,
'09 See generally CASS R. SUNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTrrUTIoN (1994);
Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV.2271

(1990) (arguing that obligations to act, provide or protect have not been held to
be enforceable constitutional rights); Robin West, Progressiveand Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990) (positing that a conservative
construction of the Constitution has prevailedunder both conservative and liberal
courts).
10 ROBERTSON, supra note 8, at 23.
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the definition of procreative liberty as a purely negative right exempts the
state from any obligation to ensure the social conditions and resources
necessary for autonomous decisionmaking about reproduction."'
The Supreme Court elaborated the distinction between the negative
and positive protection of reproductive rights in a series of cases
concerning the government's obligation to subsidize the poor woman's
right to an abortion." 2 In these cases, the Court refused to require the
state or federal government to pay for the cost of abortion services for
poor women, even though it pays for the expenses incident to childbirth.
The HarrisCourt reasoned: "[I]t simply does not follow that a woman's
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the
financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected
choices.... [A]Ithough government may not place obstacles in the path
of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation."" 3
Feminist legal scholars have pointed to the abortion-funding cases as
a prime example of the limits of constitutional privacy doctrine."' They
note that framing the abortion right as a right merely to be shielded from
state intrusion into private choices provides no basis for a constitutional
claim to public support for abortions. Catharine MacKinnon, for example,
concludes that abortion as a private privilege serves to perpetuate gender
inequality because it falls to recognize the ways in which social forces
constrain women's reproductive decisions: "The point is that [women's]
alternatives are precluded priorto the reach of the chosen legal doctrine.
They are precluded by conditions of sex, race, and class - the very
conditions the privacy frame not only leaves tacit but exists to guarantee.""' 5 Like the liberal view of harm and voluntariness, the liberal view
of the state's role ignores the role that social position plays in determining individuals' reproductive choices.
A feminist social justice critique of the negative interpretation of
liberty demonstrates a serious flaw in liberal theorizing about rights. But
we need not -abandon the liberal model of rights and adopt a positive
notion of liberty to minimize the government's facilitation of reproduc.' See Roberts, PunishingDrug Addicts, supra note 1, at 1478.
112 See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
"' Harris,448 U.S. at 316.
"14 See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE (1992); CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 101 (1987); see also ROSALIND
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMEN'S CHOICE 295-302 (1984).
,' MACKINNON, supra note 114, at 101.
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tion-assisting technologies. The prohibition of unjustified state interference with liberty does not prevent the state from refusing to support
reproduction-assisting technologies. Even the negative view of liberty
leaves the state free to decide not to lend affirmative assistance to
individuals who choose to use these technologies.
According to the liberal noninterference model, the state is not
required to support individuals' use of these technologies in any way.
Liberals who argue that the state must facilitate the use of these
technologies, by enforcing paid pregnancy contracts for instance, are thus
caught in a serious internal inconsistency. Although failing to enforce
these contracts may discourage couples from entering into these
arrangements, liberal theory does not require the state to promote
procreative arrangements in this way. As we noted above, enforcing these
contracts privileges the procreative interests of more powerful men over
the procreative interests of poorer gestational mothers. Liberals seem
willing to depart from the noninterference model only for the sake of the
most privileged members of society. But this, of course, is patently
unfair.
A feminist social justice approach not only highlights this inconsistency in the liberal position but also supports state refusal to encourage the
development and deployment of reproduction-assisting technologies.
These technologies' contribution to the subordination of women, poor
people, and people of color justifies the government's decision to refrain
from facilitating them. The state should not lend its affirmative support
to practices that demean members of society and deepen already existing
social inequities. Under this view, the state should refuse to enforce paid
pregnancy contracts because they commodify children, degrade all
women's reproductive labor, and, particularly, devalue women and
children of color. Indeed, the state could refuse to spend any public
resources for the development or deployment of reproduction-assisting
technologies on the basis of their harmful effects. The government's total
departure from this field, on the other hand, like the total prohibition of
non-coital means of procreation, may also be substantively harmful.
Rather than lead to a ban of public spending on reproduction-assisting
technologies, a feminist social justice approach might call for public
funding strategies designed to reduce the concentration of the use of these
technologies among the most affluent, thereby addressing the problem of
privilege and subordination.
How is the feminist argument that the state should not support
reproduction-assisting technologies any different from the liberal
argument that the state need not support women's access to abortion
services? The difference lies in feminists' attention to social power. A
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feminist social justice approach rejects certain state facilitation of these
technologies because of their contribution to an unjust social structure.
Thus, a feminist social justice approach takes more seriously the moral
equality of persons than does liberalism, since liberalism leaves this
structure intact, and uses methods that continue to sustain it. A feminist
social justice approach also calls for state assistance of women's right to
an abortion because the abortion right is essential to eliminating women's
social subordination and to ensuring that a woman's choice not to be a
parent can always be realized. Both these positions are consistent with a
predominant concern for dismantling unjust arrangements of race, class,
and gender power and both are consistent with ensuring substantive
liberty for all in our society, not just for those in privileged groups.
Unlike the liberal view of liberty, the feminist social justice approach
does not hinge on the false dichotomy between state interference and
noninterference." 6 Rather, it seeks to achieve a society free of invidious
hierarchies that materially impair certain individuals' reproductive
autonomy.
An examination of contemporary reproduction-assisting technologies,
then, shows that a feminist social justice approach is superior to
liberalism on the two axiological axes that undergird liberal theory itself.
That is, a feminist social justice approach is better able than liberalism to
serve as a social and political theory on which to base a political society
that takes the liberty and moral equality of all its citizens equally
seriously.

For feminist critiques on the false dichotomy between state interference
and noninterference, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources,
Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 18 (1989) (noting that
the market "is not a freestanding, natural phenomenon, but consists of rules
defined by law and backed by the power of the state"); Frances E. Olsen, The
Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 1497 (1983); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the
Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985).
11

